

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.331
19 September 1967
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

NOV 29 1967

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R. CARACCILO

(Italy)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN
U PE MYINT AUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTAÑEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. ADEBANJO

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. L. WEILER
Mr. G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the 331st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The Mexican delegation wishes to express its deep satisfaction at the submission of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/192, 193). Its congratulations are extended in the first place to the two co-Chairmen, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, who are the main co-authors of the joint draft, and then to all those who throughout these long negotiations have contributed by their suggestions and in other ways to its preparation.

3. After a careful though still incomplete study of the draft treaty, my Government considers it on the whole clearly satisfactory. Its main objective, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is adequately ensured by the prohibitions in articles I and II. These are the cornerstone of the system. They are a firm one in our view, because they are so drafted as to preclude any proliferation of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. However, as has been stated repeatedly, the various parts of the treaty must be indissolubly linked with each other; for the actual prohibitions of transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons will be effective, and even viable, only to the extent that the treaty satisfies other related requirements -- those laid down by the General Assembly in one of its most constructive and balanced resolutions, resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161).

4. My delegation believes that, broadly speaking, the draft treaty basically satisfies those requirements. Its general features are appropriate. Indeed, they could hardly be other than they are, at least so long as we live with present-day political realities. In regard to those points on which the treaty does not, in our view, fully satisfy the requirements of the acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, or any of the other requirements in resolution 2028 (XX), we propose to submit a few suggestions. Let me say at once that the amendments we have in mind do not conflict with the treaty's essential features. On the contrary, they are clearly in harmony with its objectives as spelt out in the preamble. Moreover, we believe they will contribute towards the achievement of those objectives. Our aim is, above all, to strengthen some of its provisions without essentially altering its substance, by expressing as true legal obligations what the preamble now sets forth either as a statement of intention or as the proclamation of a general principle.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

5. I will examine only those points which are the subject of our suggestions. On other points, either my country's position has already been indicated in an earlier statement (ENDC/PV.304) or we propose to make it known in the near future, when my Government has reached a final conclusion. I have in mind, for instance, the special safeguards and guarantees desired by the non-nuclear States, or at any rate by some of them. That question, as you are aware, is not dealt with in the treaty.

6. Our first suggestion, though not necessarily the most important, concerns the peaceful use of nuclear energy in general. Article IV of the draft treaty refers to this matter. First of all, I should like to express our satisfaction that the co-Chairmen have placed this article in the body of the treaty, thus deferring to a wish of the non-nuclear States. As Mr. Foster pointed out (ENDC/PV.330, para. 17), the first part of that provision is based on article 17 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186).

7. Article IV of the draft treaty enunciates two rights. The first is the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy. To preclude an interpretation by which the non-proliferation treaty might conflict with such acts, this right is expressed in a negative form, which amounts simply to a legal interpretation of the provisions of the treaty as a whole: nothing in the Treaty may be interpreted as affecting this right, which is called inalienable. The second part of the sentence refers, however, to the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This right need not be expressed negatively. On the contrary, to stress it by adopting a positive form of words seems preferable: "All the Parties shall have the right ...". Furthermore, the two rights are so very different that it would be better to devote a separate paragraph to each.

8. But that is not the most important matter. In our opinion, and in line with the views which we expressed in an earlier statement (ENDC/PV.304, para. 22), it is essential to establish the legal obligation of the nuclear Powers -- the most advanced countries -- to contribute to the technological development of the others, and to transfer and place at the disposal of those countries their scientific and technological knowledge of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We believe that the provision of such technical assistance should be made a legally-binding obligation and that the right of some countries to receive and the duty of others to share their scientific and technological knowledge should be proclaimed. We believe that if, as a contribution to international peace and security, the non-nuclear Powers renounce

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for all time certain activities and experiments which, but for the Treaty, they might carry out, it is only fair that they should receive in return as their authentic right any scientific and technological benefits derived from the experiments and activities they renounce.

9. Accordingly we have prepared a variant of article IV which takes account of those considerations. The first paragraph is identical with the first sentence of article IV of the draft treaty:

"Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty".

(ENDC/196)

10. A second paragraph, separate from the first, enunciates both the right of the parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information, and the duty of those States to contribute that are in a position to do so. This paragraph reads:

"All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States." (ibid.)

11. We believe that this duty can and should be enunciated as a true legal obligation, although the obligation is imperfect and general and its practical significance will continue to depend ultimately on the will of the nuclear Powers. What matters at this stage is to establish the actual principle of the obligation. The phrase "according to their ability" refers not only to the parties' financial and technical ability but also to their legal ability, since much of this knowledge is covered by patents owned by private persons. The last sentence emphasizes the primary importance for the non-nuclear countries that the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes shall take place above all in their territories.

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12. Our second suggestion relates to a new article on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Nearly all its components are taken from the preamble of the joint draft treaty; but they are so combined and presented that the clear and categorical offers made by the nuclear Powers do not appear as mere declarations of intention in the preamble but as an express obligation in the body of the treaty, even though only in very general terms. This is undoubtedly the question which causes the non-nuclear-weapon countries the greatest concern. Renunciation of a nuclear arsenal must not import renunciation of the use of the enormous economic potential which peaceful nuclear explosions may come to mean in the future, for instance in the execution of vast engineering projects. If the non-nuclear countries have to undertake not to develop or explode nuclear devices --- since such devices, despite their peaceful purpose, are nothing other than nuclear bombs --- they must be assured in return, categorically and unequivocally, that they will not thereby be deprived of the possible benefits of such explosions. Therefore, although the details of this complex problem must be regulated in a separate agreement, the actual right to enjoy the benefits of peaceful explosions must be recognized and enunciated in the non-proliferation treaty itself, at least in its essential details. There is an indissoluble link between renunciation of the right actually to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, and the right not to be deprived of their benefits. Renunciation of the former right is predicated on the enjoyment of the latter.

13. Broadly speaking, we are in agreement with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, for the settlement of this question (ENDC/PV.329, paras. 19 et seq.). However, as I said before, that will have to be the subject of a separate agreement. The article which, for the reasons I have given, we consider should be written into the body of the non-proliferation treaty should in our view contain the following provisions. First, it should lay down in general terms the obligation of the nuclear Powers to provide the necessary means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon Powers the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Secondly, it should indicate the general principle that assistance shall be requested and, where necessary, channeled through an appropriate international body. The debates have shown that, although nuclear explosions will have to be so carried out as not to entail proliferation in regard to non-nuclear-weapon States, these are quite rightly reluctant to be subject to the good will of the nuclear Powers for the performance of that service. Hence the essential function and part which must be assumed for this purpose by some competent

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international body, presumably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), either alone or in association with other bodies. Here we merely propose to indicate the duties of an appropriate body -- in which, we would add, the non-nuclear countries must be adequately represented. We then state, naturally, that the functions of the international body will be subject to procedures previously laid down in a special and separate agreement. The other provisions of this article are nearly all taken from the preamble: that assistance shall be non-discriminatory and that the charge shall be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. The additional requirement we have included, that assistance shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations, is taken from the suggestions offered by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, on 21 March (ENDC/PV.295, para. 74).

14. The new article would read as follows:

"1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

"2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development." (ENDC/196, article IV-A)

15. Our third proposal would transfer from the preamble to the body of the treaty the principle that

"nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories" (ENDC/192, 193, p.2).

This question is of special importance for the Latin-American countries that have already concluded a regional treaty of this kind. I am happy to be able to announce that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has just been approved by the Mexican Senate, so that it may be ratified shortly, with a declaration of waiver of the requirements for its entry into force laid down in article 28.

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16. We should like to see this principle incorporated in the body of the treaty, not only because it would thus gain in importance but also because, by its nature, that is its proper place. It is, in fact, an authoritative and mandatory interpretation of the scope of all the other provisions of the Treaty: its object is to determine what the treaty permits or prohibits, and it therefore has obvious legal effects. In other words, it is an authentic legal provision which as such does not belong in the preamble. The text of the new article would be the same as that of the last paragraph of the preamble, which I have quoted, except for the consequential omission of the introductory words "Noting that".

17. Our last suggestion refers to the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear Powers, and is of course bound up with the principle of the acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

18. Very important statements of intention have been included in the preamble of the treaty concerning the disarmament negotiations between the nuclear Powers. This seems to us a considerable step forward. Furthermore, we are fully conscious of the obvious limits to the obligations which the nuclear Powers can assume in this respect in the present treaty. We are well aware, as we said in an earlier statement (ENDC/PV.304, para. 11) that to stipulate that the non-proliferation treaty should include specific disarmament measures to be implemented by the nuclear Powers in the immediate future, would be tantamount to opposing the very existence of a non-proliferation treaty. This fact is obvious and needs no proof or further comment. But recognition of this fact, recognition of the very limited scope of the obligations that the major Powers can assume under this treaty, is perfectly reconcilable with the desire that such obligations should be formulated more clearly and precisely, without extending their scope.

19. In short, the nuclear Powers cannot actually undertake to conclude future disarmament agreements among themselves; but they certainly can undertake to endeavour to do so; that is, they can certainly undertake to initiate and pursue negotiations in good faith in order to conclude such agreements. That is precisely the content we should like to give to this obligation, which should be written into the body of the treaty. Doubtless it would be an imperfect obligation, since it would not be accompanied by sanctions, but it would be more than a statement of intention. It would be a solemn recognition of the special responsibility of the

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nuclear Powers to adopt and implement a programme for the early reduction and possible elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that this would have deep political significance.

20. In indicating the disarmament or related measures on which we say agreements should be negotiated, we have closely followed the preamble of the treaty, with two exceptions. First, we have added to the list of measures the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Secondly, reference is made in the preamble to the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of existing stockpiles, and so forth "pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament". We believe that the effect of this wording is to make an agreement on each of the measures listed entirely conditional upon its conclusion within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

21. In our opinion the article might be drafted as follows:

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control." (ENDC/196, article IV-C)

22. With reference to article VI, we have two minor suggestions to make. Since the main obligation of the treaty devolves upon the non-nuclear States, and in order to emphasize its importance within the treaty's operating machinery, we believe that a large number of ratifications should be required to bring the treaty into force. These would obviously be nearly all by non-nuclear States. Perhaps sixty, or a little less than half the members of the United Nations, would be a suitable number. We also consider, for similar reasons, that the Depositary States should be two nuclear and two non-nuclear Powers.

23. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on the still pending problem of the control or supervision of compliance with the obligations of the treaty. We believe that, if the future treaty is to function satisfactorily, an

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international control system will be required which offers the maximum guarantees of efficiency and absolute impartiality. The formula proposed by Sweden for article III (ENDC/195) seems to us highly attractive. We hope it will provide useful points for the negotiations now being conducted by the two co-Chairmen and the other countries concerned. We also believe that, as Mr. Burns has pointed out (ENDC/PV.329, para. 8), it will be difficult to arrive at an agreement on article III without a certain amount of give and take on all sides. Accordingly we shall maintain a flexible position on this question pending submission of proposals to us by our two co-Chairmen.

24. It might perhaps be useful to recall briefly some aspects of the control system for verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 7 of the Treaty provides for the establishment of an international organization which shall be generally responsible for ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from the Treaty. This agency will commence its work when the Treaty has entered into force for eleven States. Furthermore, article 13 provides that

"Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities".

25. The problem of the period which may elapse between the ratification by a State and application of the IAEA safeguards is solved by article 13 in the following manner:

"Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure."

26. It only remains for me to add that I have handed to the Secretariat a working paper ^{1/} which summarizes the suggestions I have made in this statement.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/196

27. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with interest to the statement made by the representative of Mexico, and I will study its various aspects carefully. Of course, I was glad, as I am sure we all were, to hear of the action of the Mexican Senate in approving the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186). That is good news for all of us.

28. I should like today to discuss the character and purpose of the planned United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment announced by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, on Monday 18 September in his speech analysing the status of the strategic arms race. I should particularly like to discuss the relation between this deployment decision and the efforts on which all of us here are engaged to bring the arms race under control. By way of summary, I wish to stress at the outset that it is my very strong belief that, while the United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way poses technical or political impediments to arms control, the fact that the United States found it necessary to make this decision emphasizes the importance and urgency of our work, especially in regard to non-proliferation and the control of strategic nuclear armaments.

29. First of all, it is well to emphasize the very limited nature of the proposed United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment, even upon its completion, and our intention to keep the deployment limited. The deployment will consist of an "area" defence of the United States and a "terminal" defence of some of our Minuteman sites. The United States deployment will comprise no terminal defence of urban areas and will not attempt to provide defence for those areas against a large-scale strategic missile attack of the kind the Soviet Union is capable of launching. We do not believe that it is feasible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to provide real protection for our populated areas against the strategic striking power of the other.

30. What, then, is the purpose of the deployment? While the United States, through long public debate and deferment of a decision, has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate anti-ballistic-missile deployment, this decision was considered to be the prudent course of action in the face of an emerging Communist Chinese intercontinental-ballistic-missile threat. Concurrently, such a system will have the effect of protecting our retaliatory forces against any threat which might result from a continued build-up of offensive missiles on the part of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

31. The United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment will provide area protection of United States urban areas against unsophisticated ballistic-missile attacks, such as conceivably could be launched by Communist China in the next decade. It is clear that the Chinese are placing a high priority on the development of an intercontinental missile force capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We now believe that China could have an initial intercontinental-ballistic-missile operational capability, albeit crude and vulnerable, by the early 1970s. Thus a significant purpose of the planned limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment is to provide some prudential protection of the United States population against Chinese nuclear missile attacks.

32. For the foreseeable future we view a Chinese nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies and friends as highly unlikely indeed -- particularly in face of our overwhelming strategic retaliatory capabilities. These capabilities should provide a deterrent to any such irrational move on their part. We believe it prudent, however, to invest in a system which will effectively neutralize that possibility. An important reason for our decision is the belief that our limited anti-ballistic missile deployment, designed against such a possible Chinese attack, will provide an additional indication that we intend to make concerted efforts to deter nuclear blackmail.

33. In so far as this decision relates to the current Soviet build-up and any threat to our assured destruction deterrent capability, the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile system will also have the effect of providing added protection for United States retaliatory forces. In this mode, it is not different from the hardening and dispersion of the United States offensive missile forces. Indeed, of all the ways in which the United States could guard against a possible future threat to our deterrent capability, the deployment of a hard-point anti-ballistic-missile defence for the United States Minuteman must be considered to be among the least provocative moves the United States could take under the circumstances, since it permits restraint in further United States offensive missile deployment.

34. These, then, are the main objectives of our anti-ballistic-missile deployment. I should also like to draw attention to a result which will not be achieved by this deployment. That is the protection, in the event of nuclear war, of our population against a major sophisticated attack, such as could be launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State. The deployment will not have such capability but instead will help to deter nuclear war by affording additional protection for our assured retaliatory capability.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

35. We have not abstained from a decision to deploy large urban anti-ballistic-missile defences in the United States because it is not good to protect one's people from nuclear missile attack. We have done so because it does not seem feasible to provide such defences against a major sophisticated attack which could be launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State such as the Soviet Union. Such a State has the technical and financial resources to offset any such defences and would probably respond to any significant threat to its deterrent capability by increasing its offensive missile capability. As Secretary McNamara has said:

"If we in turn opt for heavy anti-ballistic-missile deployment -- at whatever price -- we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain."

The countervailing offensive capabilities which would follow from such a deployment on our part, by thus driving the arms race to still higher plateaux, would have rendered ineffective the very defence of our cities which we had sought to achieve. The deployment now being undertaken by the United States warrants no such response; and we have no plans which should have the result of stimulating any further Soviet offensive force build-up.

36. Despite the limited character and purpose of the proposed United States anti-ballistic-missile system, we may properly inquire concerning its effect on arms control efforts, both here and in other forums. Indeed, we must be alert that misconceptions about the nature of the United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment, wilful or otherwise, be not used to impede progress on important arms-control measures.

37. As I indicated earlier, the limited United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision does not represent an acceleration of the United States-Soviet strategic arms race. The Soviet Union, which has already initiated an anti-ballistic-missile deployment, has never indicated that a limited United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment would be provocative to it, and we would assume that that view remains unchanged. We think it has now become vital that the United States and the Soviet Union be able to assure each other of the limited purpose of both offensive and defensive forces and be able to reach some agreement on controlling the nuclear strategic arms race.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

38. Secretary McNamara made the position of the United States quite clear when he stated:

"Let me emphasize -- and I cannot do so too strongly -- that our decision to go ahead with a limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way indicates that we feel that an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any the less urgent or desirable."

Mr. McNamara said more. He said:

"We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union -- primarily because the action-reaction phenomenon makes it foolish and futile. But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us is to engage in such a race, the United States possesses in ample abundance the resources, the technology, and the will to run faster in that race for whatever distance is required."

"But what we would much prefer to do is to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason: we each have reacted to each other's build-up with very conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a second-strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the worst plausible case."

"But since we now each possess a deterrent in excess of our individual needs, both of our nations would benefit from a properly-safeguarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces."

39. I need hardly repeat that the United States is firmly committed to achieving an equitable non-proliferation treaty and does not consider that this limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision should in any way decrease the desirability of a non-proliferation treaty to other nations. To the extent that our anti-ballistic-missile deployment will affect the security considerations of other countries, I believe it will favour non-proliferation. The deployment will foreclose any possibility of a successful Chinese nuclear attack on the United States and will thereby provide further assurance of our determination to support our Asian friends against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

40. Finally, my Government wishes me to emphasize today that the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision will in no way interfere with continued United States adherence to existing arms-control agreements, such as the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)); and it will in no way interfere with our efforts to achieve progress on other important arms-control objectives. We will continue to work towards the achievement of the measures which we have presented to this Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 331st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Caracciolo, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico and the United States.

"The delegation of Mexico tabled a working paper containing a summary of the suggested additions to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/196).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.